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ABSTRACT ■ This article uses large-scale survey data to examine the
influences on private-sector managers’ propensity to communicate directly to
employees in Britain and Denmark. In both countries, this propensity is
shaped by two factors: whether the senior HR manager is involved in strategy
formation, and the degree of unionization. The findings are not consistent
with Brewster’s argument that European HR managers are constrained in
applying American versions of HRM, or with ‘varieties of capitalism’ theories
which imply that companies in the two countries would have different
systemic drivers of their communications practices.
KEYWORDS: Britain ■ Denmark ■ direct communication ■ strategic HRM ■
unionization ■ varieties of capitalism
Introduction
According to Brewster, the HRM concept is essentially North American,
should not be seen as universally applicable and in particular has limited
applicability for most European countries. In his influential discussion,
he argued that ‘defining and prescribing HRM strategies for organiz-
ations implies that the organizations concerned are free to develop their
own strategies’ (1995: 2). He further argued that with the exception of
Great Britain, European firms are generally not free to develop HRM
strategies autonomously. Instead they operate with restricted autonomy,
constrained by culture, legislation, trade union involvement and work-
place norms but especially by institutional frameworks. He therefore
proposed a ‘European model of HRM’ which reflects his suggestion that
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variations in HRM practices should be viewed as products of different
types of national context (‘institutional’ and ‘HRM’) with shared
European features rather than as products of firm-level strategic decision-
making.
Thus, unlike in North America and Great Britain, variations in the
application of HRM practices by firms are not a consequence of
autonomous strategic HRM initiatives by managements and human
resource professionals, but are primarily influenced by national context
and in particular industrial relations institutions. The purpose of this
article is to test this contention in terms of one set of practices central to
strategic HRM, direct communication. This is an appropriate test of
Brewster’s argument, since strategic HRM aims to achieve strategically
anchored employee involvement through High Involvement Manage-
ment (HIM) techniques. The question this article specifically addresses is
whether it is the case that direct communication is a firm-level strategi-
cally driven practice or whether it is, as Brewster would suggest, institu-
tionally driven. In addition, we investigate the degree to which
unionization at the firm, as opposed to the country level, has an impact
on direct communication. In order to address these issues we employ data
from British and Danish private-sector firms.
The article is structured as follows. In the following sections we discuss
the concept of direct communication and the significance of the British–
Danish comparison for our investigation. Thereafter we present three
strands of theorizing relevant to sources of variation in direct communi-
cation within firms. The three strands are: strategic HRM, country effects
and unionization at the firm level, and each section leads to a hypothe-
sis. Next, we deploy firm-level data for the UK and Denmark derived
from the 2003 CRANET survey to test each of the hypotheses. Finally,
we draw conclusions.
Direct Communication
The concept of ‘direct communication’ is used here to describe manage-
ment information-giving to employees, that is not mediated through
employee representatives. Wood (1999: 367) observes that ‘the study of
human resource management (HRM) has been invigorated by the
promise that there is a best-practice, high involvement management that
can guarantee superior organizational performance’. Wood further
observes that direct communication practices are a key feature of HIM.
Other experts make similar arguments. Thus, for example, one of the
seven dimensions of HIM that Pfeffer (1998) identifies as having been
demonstrated to result in significant economic returns is that of direct
communication with employees in regard to financial performance and
European Journal of Industrial Relations 12(3)
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strategy. As a consequence, direct communication is now typically seen
as one key element of an organizational strategy of employee involve-
ment, ‘an umbrella term covering a wide range of voluntary employer-
led initiatives that are designed to encourage more active employee
participation in [organizational] affairs’ (Caldwell, 1993: 136). The
purpose of these initiatives is ‘to increase the level of employee commit-
ment to an organization’ (Guest et al., 1993: 192). The initiatives may
include some or all of the following: first, ‘increased information (flow)
down the organization’; second, ‘increased information (flow) up the
organization’; third, changes in job design; fourth, financial involvement
or participation; and, fifth, changes in leadership or management style
towards a more participative approach (Guest et al., 1993: 192). Thus
direct communication is a central element in employee involvement.
Direct communication may take different forms, be addressed to differ-
ent categories of employees and cover different subjects. It spans a
number of different practices including briefing the workforce, quality
circles, regular meetings with all or part of the workforce, suggestion
schemes, appraisal interviews, newsletters and electronic communication.
The increased use of practices to facilitate direct communication between
management and employees in the British private sector was, according
to Forth and Millward (2002), one of the more striking developments in
employment relations in the 1990s. In this article, we concentrate on the
briefing of non-managerial employees on issues of business strategy,
financial performance and work organization.
Leaving aside direct discussion of the issue of organizational perform-
ance, this article explores the related question of the determinants of
direct communication practices in British and Danish private-sector
firms. We aim to test the degree to which direct communication practices
are actually a consequence of management-initiated, firm-level strategic
approaches to HRM. The article therefore tests the association between
three factors: country or national institutional context, ‘strategic’ HRM
and firm-level unionization and the extent of direct communication.
Contrary to Brewster’s European model of HRM, our analysis indicates
that the first of these variables is not associated with direct communi-
cation, but the other two are.
The British–Danish Comparison
The British–Danish comparison provides appropriate national conditions
for testing Brewster’s argument about the impact of the national insti-
tutional setting. There are important differences between the two
countries’ institutional frameworks. Within the influential ‘varieties
of capitalism’ conceptualization, Britain has been unambiguously
Croucher et al.: Direct Communication in British and Danish Firms
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categorized, along with North America, as a ‘liberal market economy’
(LME) and Denmark as a ‘coordinated market economy’ (CME) (Hall
and Gingerich, 2005; Hall and Soskice, 2001). The gap between the two
models, it has been argued by one ‘varieties of capitalism’ theorist, is
increasing (Thelen, 2001: 72). Neither country occupies what Hall and
Soskice (2001) describe as an ‘ambiguous’ position in terms of the
LME/CME divide. The LME–CME distinction is explored further below,
but at this stage the essential point is that the two countries fall clearly
within the two different categories. The Danish model is somewhat
distinctive within the CME category for its high degree of regulation by
collective bargaining rather than by legislation, requiring relatively little
state intervention for its maintenance (Due et al., 1994; Scheuer, 1998). The
Danish model is relatively uncontested at the industrial and political levels
in comparison with, for example, the German (Lane, 2000).
Strategic HRM
Gooderham et al. (1999) distinguish two generic systems of HRM prac-
tices, ‘calculative’ (cf. Fombrun et al., 1984) and ‘collaborative’ (cf. Beer
et al., 1985) with more recent versions of collaborative HRM embracing
HIM. They argue that both approaches may be present in the same firm.
Calculative practices are aimed at achieving efficiency at the individual
level through the application of individual appraisals and reward systems.
Collaborative or HIM practices derive from a view of employees as
participants in a project based on commitment, communication and part-
nership and thus include the regular, direct communication of strategic,
financial and organizational information about the enterprise to
employees. Direct communication is therefore a key aspect to collabora-
tive HRM or HIM.
As indicated at the outset of this article, a central issue is the extent to
which key HRM practices such as direct communication may in fact be
described as ‘strategic’ in the European setting. Schuler and Jackson
(2005) argue that the transformation of personnel management into
HRM in the USA from the mid-1970s onwards was a response to a
growing professionalism among HRM practitioners and a growing
recognition of the importance of human resources to companies’ success.
As a consequence, businesses began to view human resource pro-
fessionals as partners ‘who should be involved in the strategic decision
making processes of the firm’ (Schuler and Jackson, 2005: 12). This aspect
of HRM gave rise to the concept of strategic HRM in which there is a
particular emphasis on the role of HR professionals informing and
reflecting the organization’s strategic objectives. The question we are
pursuing is whether this applies in the European setting.
European Journal of Industrial Relations 12(3)
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From a strategic HRM viewpoint the scale of a firm’s strategic HRM
practices, including direct communication, is determined by the central-
ity of the human resource department in strategy development (Schuler
and Jackson, 2005). That is, for HRM to meet the needs of the business
‘effective HRM’, that is, HIM, ‘requires an understanding of and integra-
tion with an organization’s strategic objectives’ (p. 13). It follows that this
understanding and integration are most effectively achieved if the human
resource department is involved at the outset in the development of
business strategy.
Thus, from the strategic HRM perspective the extent of direct
communication between management and employees is a product of the
degree to which the human resource function is party to the strategy
development process. Hence we hypothesize as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Direct communication within firms is greater if the head of
human resources is involved in strategy formation.
Country Effects
Our second argument, leading to hypothesis 2, concerns the character-
istics of the institutional setting and builds on Brewster’s European
model of HRM. Three types of literature encourage the expectation that
Britain and Denmark would have different levels of direct communi-
cation. The first, already touched on above, is the ‘varieties of capitalism’
literature. The second is that which seeks to link national employment
relations systems to national culture. The third is work demonstrating the
deep historic roots of national characteristics in the area. We deal with
these three approaches in turn.
‘Varieties of capitalism’ literature explains that in CMEs, stronger
information-sharing is to be expected than in LMEs, as part of a general
structural bias towards consensus-building, in particular within organiz-
ations (Hall and Soskice, 2001). There are therefore well-embedded prac-
tices in companies for information-sharing with employees (Kristensen,
1997). These practices are externally supported by strong unemployment
protection measures (Estévez-Abe et al., 2001). In LMEs, where there is
greater reliance on external labour markets to regulate the employment
relationship, such arrangements are less in evidence. Managements’ infor-
mation-giving is directed at financial institutions rather than employees
(Vitols, 2000).
One analyst arguing the importance of culture for national employ-
ment relations systems (Pot, 2000) suggests that managers have high
communications practices for cultural reasons. Thus, Nordic managers
would adopt relatively ‘collaborative’ HR strategies and communicate
Croucher et al.: Direct Communication in British and Danish Firms
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intensively with employees irrespective of the existence or otherwise of
specific institutions such as unions, in contrast to British managers.
Danish specialists stress that this is part of a wider Danish management
style, demonstrated in the relatively low degrees of ‘authority by title’
and ‘power distance’ between managers and employees in relation to
other European countries (Rogaczewska et al., 2004).
A third type of literature emphasizes the importance of different
historical trajectories and, in common with the two other literatures
discussed above, stresses the two countries’ quite different current evolu-
tions in respect of employee communications. Nordic countries gener-
ally have historically been distinguished by high degrees of cooperative
management–union behaviour at workplace level (Galenson, 1998). A
Nordic researcher recently asserted that Denmark still has the highest
level of employee involvement in organizational decision-making
processes of any European country (Lundvall, 2002). Another Nordic
commentator has suggested that Danish managers’ consultative style is
primarily based on deeply-embedded consensual and voluntary behav-
iours rather than on institutions or legislative compliance per se (Kris-
tensen, 1997). Due et al. (2000) have demonstrated the enduring
significance of the historic compromise between Danish employers and
labour at the end of the 19th century.
In Britain, on the other hand, the history of information-sharing has
been very different and the contemporary results shallower. Even during
the exigencies of the Second World War, employers were reluctant to
share information with employees (Croucher, 1982). Later state initia-
tives to extend existing joint management–union bodies through legis-
lation on ‘industrial democracy’ in the late 1970s failed because they
received only equivocal support from both unions and management
bodies (Taylor, 1993). A recent analysis of employer stances in relation
to the Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations in Britain
shows that this tradition remains strong. The Regulations (which do not
specify union forms of representation) allow employers the option of
inaction unless employees trigger the regulations, while managers often
have equivocal attitudes to their implementation (Hall, 2005).
All of these three types of approach, ‘Varieties of Capitalism’, cultural
theorists and those emphasizing different historic evolutions, point in a
similar direction. Our second hypothesis is therefore as follows:
Hypothesis 2: Direct communication within firms varies according to
country, with Danish firms characterized by a stronger degree of direct
communication than British firms.
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Unionization
‘Indirect’ communication to employees via employee representatives is a
characteristic of the European model of employment relations. In
Europe, its relation to direct communication, that is, the focus of this
study, is generally complementary. Research on 25 British-based multi-
national companies (MNCs) operating in Europe found that ‘direct’ and
‘indirect’ channels operate in complementary ways (Wood and Fenton
O’Creevy, 2005). Other research on the European subsidiaries of a group
of British-owned companies showed that employees with access to union
and works council representation saw direct communication as more
useful than those without such access. The researchers suggest that such
employees are ‘more likely to take a general interest in developments and
consequently view other means [i.e. other than “indirect” communi-
cation] of communication as useful’ (Kessler et al., 2004: 528). Employees
in European countries, they argue, may have more confidence in dealing
with direct communication where collective voice mechanisms are
present. In other words, unionization increased their confidence in their
capacity to evaluate and act on management information. This confidence
seems likely in turn to be reflected in their elected representatives’
requesting information from management irrespective of the channel
used.
In Great Britain, as in many other countries, trade union membership
has declined and stood at around 30 percent of the workforce at the time
of the last comprehensive survey (Kersley et al., 2006). In the 1970s,
when union membership, power and influence were greater, unions
insisted where possible on managers communicating to the workforce
solely through them. This, together with employer reservations, was a
contributory reason for British ‘indirect’ consultative bodies (joint
consultative committees) having been historically weak relative to their
analogues in other EU countries (Taylor, 1993). As power shifted
towards management in the 1970s, the latter increasingly insisted on
direct communication with employees (Denham et al., 1997; Hyman,
1997; Marchington, 1993; Ramsay, 1977). Kessler et al. point out (2004)
that unions could adopt two alternative views. Either they could view
this as a conscious attempt to bypass and marginalize them, or they could
view it as a complement to union channels of communication. In the
1990s, this posed a real dilemma for unions, interested in helping
employees improve their information on the company’s directions on
work organization and financial prospects, but opposed to being them-
selves bypassed. Increasingly, union representatives appear to have made
a pragmatic shift towards the second alternative identified by Kessler et
al., especially since direct communication may on occasion entail
Croucher et al.: Direct Communication in British and Danish Firms
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bargaining or at least joint employee–management decision-making and
therefore bring an extension of worker influence on management (Wood
and Fenton O’Creevy, 2005).
Although little research has focused on workplace representatives’ atti-
tudes to management communication, they are clearly no longer in a
position to insist that only they may be used as the sole channel of
communication. There may also be employee pressure on representatives
for them to take a more positive attitude to ‘direct’ communication. It
seems likely in an LME context such as Great Britain, where external
labour markets are relatively important, that increasingly widespread
feelings of insecurity among employees mean that information about
company strategy and prospects is of correspondingly greater interest to
them. Workplace representatives seem likely to represent their members
by demanding more information to the latter and not simply to them-
selves. In short, unionized firms in Great Britain are more likely to have
direct communication than their non-unionized counterparts.
Indeed research on Great Britain has indicated an association between
unionization and ‘direct’ communication. Most unionized workplaces
now have multiple communication channels (Bryson et al., 2004). In the
latest full report of the British Workplace Employment Relations Survey
(WERS), Kersley et al. (2006) demonstrated increasing management use
of direct communication across a range of issues, and that this was
particularly apparent in unionized workplaces. Other research using the
WERS dataset also concluded that levels of information disclosure were
higher in unionized settings although this did not lead to higher levels of
employee commitment or organizational performance (Peccei et al.,
2005).
Suggestions that European workplace representatives increasingly
encourage or at least see no prospect of opposing direct communication
seem likely to apply a fortiori to Denmark. About 82 percent of the
Danish workforce is unionized; membership has remained stable since
1994, but density has fallen because of an increase in potential members
(Jørgensen, 2002). Danish unions have benefited from involvement in a
‘Ghent system’ of unemployment insurance, greatly raising employee
incentives to membership (Western, 1997). They face little competition
from works councils; indeed, councils and unions work in complemen-
tary and even identical ways.
Since 1973, Danish employees have had rights to elect representatives
to board level, while a peak-level agreement dating back to 1947 provides
for the appointment at workplace level of a joint ‘cooperation committee’
(samarbejdsudvalg) through which employee representatives may receive
information regarding the firm’s efficiency and competitiveness, ‘co-
influence’ management decisions and codetermine others (Haug, 2004). One
authority cites as commonplace a practice whereby works councillors
European Journal of Industrial Relations 12(3)
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meet with management in the morning to reach agreement, and the same
committee reconvenes in the afternoon as a union–management group to
ratify the morning’s decisions (Slomp, 1998). At workplace level, a 1999
survey of over 7000 Danish workplace representatives showed 37 percent
of them reporting that they felt that management used direct communi-
cation to bypass representatives (Navrbjerg, 1999). However, there are no
longitudinal data to indicate whether there is a tendency for such
communication to increase. Navrbjerg (2003) argues that in general
Danish management employs ‘soft’ or ‘collaborative’ HRM methods that
do not directly threaten trade unionism, since workplace representatives
are widely viewed positively by management as ‘sparring partners’ rather
than as opponents.
Kristensen (1997) suggests that skilled employees in Denmark, especi-
ally in manufacturing, demand high levels of information on production
matters from management. This is consistent with the suggestion of
Peccei et al. (2005), based on literature from different countries, that
where there is a high proportion of skilled labour (as in Denmark), there
is proportionately greater pressure on management to communicate
directly. It therefore seems likely that Danish workplace union represen-
tatives actively encourage managers to communicate directly, whilst
simultaneously trying to ensure that this does not threaten their role as
intermediaries (Navrbjerg, 2003).
It has been questioned whether cooperative relations in Denmark are
being eroded outside the workplace, with possible ‘spill-over’ effects for
the latter. Some researchers have pointed to an apparently increasing need
for legislative interventions to compensate for failures of employers and
unions to agree, but a degree of state intervention has on the other hand
been required for decades and is therefore not novel (Falkner and Leiber,
2004). Moreover, recent successful tripartite projects in labour market co-
ordination suggest that wider, extra-workplace activities involving unions
continue to be useful to both the state and employers (Etherington and
Jones, 2004).
In short, the literature demonstrates an association between unioniza-
tion and managers’ direct communication practices in Western Europe.
However, it is only possible to speculate that union representatives them-
selves exert pressure on management to achieve this and it may be that
the underlying characteristics of unionized workforces are the key issue.
Unionized workforces may exert more pressure on both management
and their representatives to provide information, possibly because they
feel this may assist them in making their own independent judgements.
In this case, the extent of union membership rather than representatives’
attitudes could be the most relevant factor. Our third hypothesis is there-
fore as follows:
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Hypothesis 3: Direct communication within firms varies according to the
level of unionization at the firm level. Firms characterized by high levels
of unionization will have a stronger degree of direct communication than
firms with low levels of unionization.
Methodology
Data
The data used in the study were derived from the 2003 CRANET survey,
by far the most comprehensive international survey of HR policies and
practices at the organizational level. CRANET is a regular comparative
survey of organizational policies and practices in HRM across the world
conducted by a network operating in 39 countries (see Brewster et al.,
2004, for full details of the questionnaire and its methodology). The unit
of analysis is the organization and the respondent is the highest-ranking
corporate officer in charge of HRM. The 2003 questionnaire was
developed using an iterative process between network members and
based on previous experience of running survey rounds since 1990.
For the UK, respondents were identified via a database of senior HR
managers in 8780 UK private and public sector organizations with over
100 employees; 1115 organizations responded, giving a response rate of
12.7 percent. For Denmark, the population of organizations was identi-
fied using a database from the Danish Census Bureau. Questionnaires
were distributed to every organization of over 100 employees on this
database, producing a total of 2653 organizations; 516 of these responded,
giving a response rate of 19 percent. Despite the relatively low response
rates the high absolute numbers of responses should promote reliability
of the results. In addition, the data for both countries were examined to
ensure that they were representative of the population in terms of
industry sector and organization size.
As this article focuses on private-sector firms, all public-sector
organizations were removed from the dataset. Because of potential
‘country-of-origin’ effects all firms with non-indigenous ownership were
also removed. This reduced the overall sample to 951 responses compris-
ing 695 UK and 256 Danish private-sector firms.
Firms in our British sample are generally larger than those in its Danish
equivalent. In the British case, 25.9 percent of the sample had 100–250
employees, 49.6 percent had 251–1000, and 24.5 had over 1000. In the
Danish case, the corresponding proportions were 45.7, 39.5 and 14.8
percent. However, the national samples are reasonably well-matched
since they contain medium-sized as well as large firms. As we note later,
we also control for size in our analyses.
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Measures and Analysis
The dependent or criterion variable, Direct Communication, is a compos-
ite measure of direct communication, that is, whether organizations brief
clerical and manual employees on issues of business strategy, financial
performance and the organization of work. In the CRANET question-
naire, this question follows another asking about indirect methods of
communication (i.e. through staff representative bodies) with employees.
A seven-point scale was created, with six indicating the briefing of both
clerical and manual employees on all three issues, and zero indicating no
briefing of either category on any of the issues.
The independent variables were measured as follows:
Strategic nature of HRM: This is an index consisting of responses to
seven questions from the CRANET survey and is designed to assess how
‘strategic’ the role of the HR department within the organization is. The
seven questions are:
• Does the head of the personnel/HR department have a place on the
main Board of Directors or the equivalent? (Yes = 1, no = 0.)
• At what stage is the person responsible for personnel/HR involved in
the development of business strategy? (A four-point scale: consulta-
tion from the outset = 4, not consulted = 1.)
• Who has the primary responsibility for major policy decisions on the
following issues: pay and benefits, recruitment and selection, training
and development, industrial relations, workforce expansion/reduc-
tion? (A four-point scale: line management = 1, line management in
consultation with HR = 2, HR in consultation with line management
= 3, HR department = 4.)
The sum of the responses to the above seven questions was used to
form an index that ranged from 1 (low degree of strategic HRM) to 20
(high degree of strategic HRM). The reliability of this index as measured
by Cronbach’s alpha was satisfactory (0.71).
Country: This national-context variable was operationalized as the two
nations, Britain and Denmark.
Union Presence: This is an index consisting of the responses to three
questions from the CRANET survey and was designed to assess the
degree of union presence within organizations. The three questions were:
• What proportion of the total number of employees in your organiz-
ation are members of a trade union? Firms were divided into three
categories: 0 percent = 1, 1–50 percent = 2, and over 50 percent = 3.
• Do trade unions have any influence on your organization? (Yes = 1,
no = 0.)
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• Do you recognize trade unions for the purpose of collective bargain-
ing? (Yes = 1, no = 0.)
The sum of the responses to the above questions was used to form an
index that ranged from 1 (no union presence) to 5 (high degree of union
presence). The index had high reliability as measured by Cronbach’s
alpha (0.82).
In addition, it was considered that such factors as size, industry sector
and the age of the firm may have some bearing on the degree of direct
communication within a firm and these were included as control vari-
ables. Their operationalization is as follows:
Industry sector: This is a dichotomous variable that distinguishes manu-
facturing (0) and services (1).
Organization size: This is operationalized as the log (10) of the total
number of employees.
Age of organization: This is operationalized as the log (10) of the number
of years since the organization was founded.
Results
The results (Table 1) show that all the variables, including the criterion
variable, were distributed significantly differently from a normal distri-
bution. As the criterion variable was actually truncated, it was recoded as
high briefing (those organizations that scored 4 or more on the seven-
point scale used above) or low briefing (those that scored 3 or less), in
order to create a dichotomous variable. Because of this and the amount
of skew in a number of the predictor variables a logistic regression
analysis was used to test our hypotheses.
Prior to testing the hypotheses, a bivariate correlation analysis of all of
the study’s variables was conducted. Table 2 shows that there is initial
support for Hypothesis 1 in that there is a significant correlation between
European Journal of Industrial Relations 12(3)
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TABLE 1. Kolmogorov–Smirnov Test of Normality
Statistic d.f. Significance
Industry sector .370 618 .000
Organization size .104 569 .000
Age of organization .071 569 .000
Country .476 536 .000
Union presence .187 536 .000
HR involvement in strategy .356 536 .000
Direct communication .212 536 .000
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Strategic Nature of HRM and Direct Communication. Similarly, there is
support for Hypothesis 3 in that there is a relatively strong correlation
between Union Presence and Direct Communication. In regard to
Country and Direct Communication the correlation is also significant
indicating some support for Hypothesis 2.
In general, the correlations between the independent variables, includ-
ing the control variables, are relatively small. However, there is one
marked exception: the strong correlation between Country and Union
Presence (.562). In the UK, 38 percent of firms had a complete absence
of any union presence, and only 40 percent had more than 10 percent
unionization; only 19 percent reported majority union membership. In
the Danish setting, by contrast, there were no non-union establishments
and only four percent with 10 percent unionization or under. By contrast,
69 percent of Danish firms reported majority union membership. Quite
clearly the testing of our hypotheses requires controlling for the inter-
action effect between Country and Union Presence.
A logistic regression analysis using the enter method was conducted in
three stages. Firstly, the control factors of Industry Sector, Organization
Size and Age of Organization were entered into the analysis. At the
second stage of the analysis Country, Union Presence, and Strategic
Nature of HRM were entered and then at the third stage, the interaction
between Country and Union Presence was entered into the analysis. This
analysis was performed using listwise deletion of missing values, reducing
the sample size to 536. Since this maintains a ‘subjects to predictors’ ratio
of 89:1 it is still sufficient to provide reliable results (Cohen and Cohen,
1983). Tables 3 and 4 display the results.
Table 4 shows that Country did not have a significant effect on Direct
Communication. Therefore Hypothesis 2 was not supported.
Union Presence was shown to have a significant positive impact on
Direct Communication: those organizations with higher levels of union-
ization tend to engage in direct communication to both manual and
clerical employees on a wider range of issues. Thus Hypothesis 3 is
supported. This effect disappeared when the interaction between
Country and Union Presence was entered into the analysis, but as this
final step in the model was not significant it can be disregarded.
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TABLE 3. Model Summary (N = 534)
Model Chi square d.f. Significance Step Step d.f. Step
chi-squared significance
1 30.599 3 .000 30.599 3 .000
2 65.719 6 .000 35.121 3 .000
3 66.243 7 .000 .524 1 .469
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Strategic Nature of HRM had a positive relationship with briefing inci-
dence, indicating that those firms in which HR is highly involved in the
development of HR strategy are more likely to brief their clerical and
manual workers on a range of issues. Thus Hypothesis 1 was supported.
We may note that, of the control variables, Industry Sector was the only
one to have a significant impact on Direct Communication. The negative
regression coefficient indicates that manufacturing firms are more likely
to brief their manual and clerical staff.
Finally, in regard to the complete model we observed that explained
variance expressed in terms of Nagelkerke’s adjusted general coefficient
of determination (R2) is 0.19 (Nagelkerke, 1991). This indicates a satis-
factory level of overall explanation of direct communication despite the
limited number of statistically significant explanatory variables we have
employed.
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TABLE 4. Coefficients of Variables Included in the Model (N = 534)
Model β Wald Sig.
1
(Constant) 2.279 15.965 .000
Industry sector –.957 28.314 .000
Age (log) –.219 1.292 .256
Size (log) –.029 .031 .861
2
(Constant) 1.469 4.758 .029
Industry sector –.761 14.603 .000
Age (log) –.301 2.255 .133
Size (log) –.162 .839 .360
Country –.014 .002 .960
Unionization .229 11.703 .001
HR strategic involvement .724 14.753 .000
3
(Constant) .857 1.081 .428
Industry sector –.745 13.808 .000
Age –.315 2.437 .119
Size –.174 .954 .329
Country .572 .444 .505
Unionization .382 2.956 .086
HR strategic involvement .733 15.047 .000
Country X unionization –.132 .523 .469
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Conclusions
This article has examined a significant aspect of Brewster’s (1995)
argument that European companies are not generally free to determine
HR strategies because of the constraints on them. The article’s findings
are important in relation to institutionalist approaches that focus on
national structures and practices in developing their cross-national
models. They also have relevance to the ongoing debate about the
complex links between direct communication with employees, unioniza-
tion and their relationships to organizational performance (for a
summary, see Peccei et al., 2005).
Brewster’s contention was tested through comparing data from Britain
and Denmark, which provided it with only equivocal support. The article
establishes that the antecedents of firms’ propensity to communicate
directly with employees in Britain and Denmark are similar in both
countries despite the marked systemic differences in the two national
cases. They are the involvement of HR managers in strategy develop-
ment, and the level of unionization at the firm-level. Institutionalist
approaches stress the differences between the national systems and the
way that these structure firms’ behaviours, but we find that direct
communication has similar antecedents in private sector firms in both
countries.
Our primary finding is that in both Britain and Denmark, firms involv-
ing their HR managers in strategy development are significantly more
likely to have direct communication than those which do not. This
finding holds true even after controlling for the level of unionization.
Thus, independent of the unionization factor, a strategic approach to
HRM, denoted by the integration of the HRM function into the strategy
formulation process is associated with high levels of direct communi-
cation with employees. In this sense, then, HR managers encourage a
strategic approach to employee communication where allowed to do so
by senior management. Brewster’s argument is therefore refuted, since a
‘strategic’ approach to HRM is possible not only in the LME setting of
Great Britain, but also in the CME setting of Denmark.
Our secondary finding is that the level of unionization at the firm-level
was significant in determining whether direct communication occurred.
Overall levels of unionization were significant predictors of how far
companies communicated across a wide range of issues with employees.
Previous British studies using smaller datasets have shown an association
between union presence and direct communication and our findings
confirm these analyses. We also show that the same holds true in the
Danish case. Our findings tend to suggest that unionization levels have
proportionate effects in encouraging managements to communicate
directly with employees. We therefore tentatively speculate that the
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attitudes of unionized workforces, in particular scepticism about
employer-disseminated information, are perceived by management and
in turn induce them to intensify their communication efforts. Case study
investigation would be required to investigate whether this hypothesis is
supportable and if it proves correct, to demonstrate precisely how the
mechanisms operate in practice. However, it seems clear that the almost
complete absence of discussion of the role of unionization at the firm-
level in strategic HRM literature for the deployment of HRM practices
is an unfortunate deficit that should be addressed.
This article has two significant limitations. First, Brewster’s thesis is
only tested through one international comparison and in terms of only
one, albeit core, HRM practice. Clearly further international compari-
sons involving additional HRM practices are required to provide a
comprehensive test of Brewster’s argument. Second, the data we have
employed include only firms with 100 or more employees. Thus gener-
alization across the whole of the two national populations of firms is
impossible. Our firm-level findings nevertheless serve to underline a limi-
tation of the national-system approach Brewster adopted in the develop-
ment of his European model of HRM, and also used in ‘varieties of
capitalism’ theorising since national-system approaches may obscure
firm-level similarities. Further research on other practices across other
countries is clearly required, but our study undermines Brewster’s
argument to the extent that it suggests that strategic HRM is possible at
least in the two distinct contexts we have examined. Similarly, it shows
significant firm-level similarities at firm level across two countries repre-
senting highly distinct varieties of capitalism.
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